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Nearly a decade has passed since any nation has announced an ex-
plicit decision to acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation has
been slow, at least by comparison with many of the pessimistic estimates
made in the past, and some analysts expect that its pace will remain as
slow in the next decade. Others take a very different view. They point
out that the nuclear warheads and carriers are becoming-at least from
the technological and economic points of view-ever more widely avail-
able, and they argue that, for this reason alone, rapid proliferation is
much more likely in the next decade or two than in the past. India and
Pakistan, Israel and Egypt, Brazil and Argentina, Sweden, Switzerland,
Japan or West Germany, might not have to duplicate the efforts of
France or China to acquire comparable nuclear capabilities. More im-
portant, it has become increasingly clear that quite rudimentary nuclear
capabilities might satisfy the political, psychological and even strategic
objectives of numerous potential "Nth" countries; it is not always
necessary to overtake the superpowers. In short, as far as narrow mili-
tary, technical and economic obstacles are concerned, proliferation in
the coming decade or two might be unprecedentedly rapid. But focus-
ing on military, technical, and economic issues alone is too narrow a
view-precisely because these are not as constraining as many thought.
It would appear therefore that the political issues should be upgraded
from important to dominant. Political analyses of such issues are, of
course, inherently uncertain, at least in the medium and long run.
Therefore, we will not be able to forecast reliably the future pace of
nuclear proliferation. Yet two decades of slow proliferation do raise the
hope that future proliferation may likewise be slow-perhaps even
slower.
We should note that certain attitudes on nuclear issues are now wide-
spread which were almost unheard of ten years ago, at least in general
discussion. Policies aimed at dealing with nuclear proliferation should
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take some account of these. For example, ten years ago the strategic
posture of the U.S. rested in large part on an ability and determination
to initiate the use of nuclear weapons to thwart aggression. While this
nuclear threat remains important in many respects, prevailing attitudes
toward "first use" of nuclear weapons have changed considerably. The
U.S. will probably adopt a virtual "no-first-use" policy-perhaps with-
out making a deliberate decision to do so, and perhaps without even
calculating all its results. Or again, while it was once believed that
"escalation" would be more or less automatic and catastrophic, in the
course of a mere five years we have come to believe that escalation
might be deliberately controlled and perhaps even stopped or reversed.
The notion of a U.S.-Soviet "spasm war," in which all weapons were
fired immediately for maximum destructiveness, has ceased to guide
military planning in the U.S. (and, it seems likely, in the Soviet Union,
France, and elsewhere-despite much rhetoric to the contrary). A more
or less implicit sense of appositeness about the use of nuclear threats
and attacks has developed. All of this may eventually force some ex-
tensive alterations in deterrent strategy, arms-control thinking, and
foreign policy in general; and, in turn, all these changes will affect the
incentives of various nations to acquire nuclear weapons.
Even very extensive proliferation does not necessarily make world-
wide holocaust inevitable-or even particularly likely. This is true even
if twenty to thirty independent states have nuclear weapons of various
kinds with various systems of command and control. Imagine, for ex-
ample, that Che Guevarra had two nuclear missiles available to him at
some date in the near future. He has said that if this situation came
about, he would be unable to restrain himself from launching the mis.
siles at New York City and Washington. In fact, he would probably be
considerably less likely to make such a statement, let alone carry it out,
if he actually controlled two missiles. But imagine, hypothetically, that
he had no sense of responsibility for the country within which he was
operating at the time, and that nothing else restrained him from launch-
ing the missiles. The United States would probably retaliate in some
dramatic and decisive fashion, and other small countries with nuclear
systems would be induced as a result to take a second look at their ar-
rangements for controlling nuclear weapons. Although these events
would entail immense suffering and destruction, human life would go
on. The general pattern of international relations might even continue
much as before, and the United States would recuperate rapidly from
the damage that the two missiles had inflicted.
Even widespread proliferation might not increase the likelihood of a
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catastrophic U.S.-Soviet thermonuclear war very much, if at all. Doubt-
less the probability of some nuclear use would increase, but even this
might be very limited. In the first place, the kind of incident imagined
above is not likely to happen more than once, if ever. And if prolifera-
tion continues, the attitudes about "first use," the risks of unsafe tech-
niques, disproportionate response, etc., which now inhibit the United
States and the United Kingdom might inhibit all or most of the other
nuclear states as well.2 All nations with large forces and most nations
with small nuclear forces might acquire some capability for measured,
controlled and deliberate response. Just as "our military and civilian
leaders are unanimous," according to a recent Presidential address,3
"in their conviction that our armed might is and always must be so
controlled as to permit measured response in whatever crises may con-
front us," so the leaders of other nations would be likely to discover a
similar need for controlled capabilities and flexible strategies. An inter-
national system in which there had been widespread proliferation might
thus be much less accident-prone and aggression-prone than many
people have estimated in the past. While we cannot, of course, make
definite or reliable forecasts on these inherently uncertain matters, we
can say that there are reasons to believe that although proliferation
increases many dangers, it alleviates others. In any case one cannot
prove that it would necessarily increase the probability of a very serious
catastrophe for the U.S. or for mankind.
The argument can even be made that nuclear weapons make possible
a "fair" solution to the problem of national defense, since one country
does not have to buy its security at the expense of its neighbor's; in the
past, by contrast, even if a country had obtained security by only a
moderate superiority, it could usually hope to use that moderate superi-
ority to overwhelm its opponent without suffering catastrophic losses.
Any country with a properly designed nuclear deterrent system can
hope (so the argument goes) to be strong enough for deterrence and yet
not strong enough to execute a disarming first strike against another
nuclear power. Thus one country's strength need not necessarily mean
its neighbor's weakness-deterrence, unlike superiority, can be both
effective and symmetric. Thus one might conclude with Pierre Gallois,
that "the further we advance in the ballistic-nuclear age, the more
possible it becomes to outlaw violence, even if the aggressor nation is
[2.] A fairly wide range of nuclear uses and the possible aftereffects of the situations
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TIM INTRODucrIoN OF NucLF.A WEAPONs (Hudson Institute Pub. No. HI-621-RR,. Jan. 26.
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stronger and more richly supplied with combat means than the nation
it threatens." 4
Yet despite all these arguments, we cannot be confident either that
the future pace of proliferation will be slow or that its consequences
would not be very serious.5 In fact, analysts, scholars, policy makers, and
men in the street agree not only that it is crucial to decrease the likeli-
hood of nuclear use by those who possess nuclear weapons but also that
the spread of those weapons to other countries is itself a source of
danger. While all of these people may be wrong, I share their judgment
at least in its less apocalyptic form. I will assume in this paper that the
reader shares my concern about the danger of future proliferation and
wants to improve even the current situation-perhaps by trying to
exploit some of the seemingly "desirable" characteristics of the nuclear
trends mentioned above, since there may be much wisdom in some of
the developments that have occurred or are now occurring.
While there is a wide consensus on the need to inhibit further nu-
clear spread or use, there are surpisingly few long-term policy ideas on
how to do this. A reasonably complete list might go as follows:
1. Attempt, at least temporarily, to prolong the current situation,
hoping meanwhile for desirable marginal or far-reaching changes.
2. If the status quo must change, attempt to make it evolve so slowly
that much time will be bought and then hope that this time will
allow other developments to occur (these other developments are
rarely specified).
3. De-emphasize or ignore all long-range problems and deal with
each issue as it comes up in a pragmatic and ad hoc fashion.
4. Accept the fact that proliferation will occur and try to live with
this "inevitable" large-scale diffusion of nuclear weapons-again
in an ad hoc or pragmatic fashion.
5. Work for universal and comprehensive arms-control systems or
world government.
It may well be that this list covers the total range of practical policies
and that one need not look for anything else; but this seems most doubt-
ful. I have occasionally argued" that serious changes in the international
system seem most likely to be made as a result of an intense crisis or a
[4.] PIERRE GALLoIs, THE BALANCE OF TmOR: STRATEGY FOR T E NUCLEAR AGE 113(1961).
[5.] See KAHN, ON ESCALATION: METAPHORS AND SCENARIOS 97-101 (1965) for a discusson
of the pros and cons of nuclear proliferation.
[6.] See, e.g., KAHN, THINKING ABouT THE UNTHINKABLE 153-58 (1962).
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small or large nuclear war. I have also argued that it should be a major
objective of negotiations to lay the groundwork for the constructive
exploitation of such crises, or of small or large wars. It seems most
unlikely that the world will be sufficiently motivated to work out a safer
international system as a result of peaceful negotiations around a con-
ference table. But national plans and international negotiations may lay
a basis for action in the conditions of changed power relationships and
nuclear attitudes which might be the immediate aftermath of some
violent world experience or dramatic crises.
I still believe in the value of such preparations. But some ad hoc and
pragmatic but important peaceful changes could be made in the current
institutional and international environment. These changes could
prove large enough to make important differences and yet remain small
enough to be achievable.
I will begin by proposing a set of criteria that any long-range
"anti-nuclear" policy should try to meet. A description and discussion
of such criteria is in itself an important part of the proposed investiga-
tionT-possibly more important than a debate on the specific proposals.
They could, for example, help clear the air for proposals quite different
from the ones suggested but which are-again-either more practical
or more far-reaching than many which are currently discussed; in any
case they attempt to focus attention on the main issues and long-range
nuclear issues in general.
Fifteen Criteria for a Long-Range Anti-Nuclear Policy8
The fifteen criteria listed below are, of course, by no means holy
writ, nor are they the only ones that could be listed, but they are at
least specific examples of what a policy for the nuclear age should
accomplish.
1. It should make nuclear weapons be and seem to be practically
almost unusable-either politically or physically.
2. In particular, it should be likely to prevent nuclear intimida-
tion.
3. It should decrease the prestige associated with owning nuclear
weapons.
[7.] In addition to the forthcoming report by C. Dibble and H. Kahn, supra note 1,
a discussion of these criteria will be published early in 1967 in the California Law Review.
[8.] The term "anti-nuclear" is used deliberately, in recognition that some readers
would find it a suitable description of the ideas advanced. The term does make a crude
sort of point. And there seems no other acceptable term: something like "nuclear de-
functionalization" might be a little more precise, but it seems to be objectionable on
stylistic grounds.
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4. It should not require Italy, Japan, India, West Germany, or
France to accept an invidiously inferior status or an unneces-
sarily precarious security position.
5. Yet if nuclear weapons are used, it should limit the damage that
is done (it should not rely on deterrence working perfectly).
6. Thus, it should be competent to withstand crises, small and even
large conventional wars, and some breaches and violations.
7. It should limit proliferation.
8. It should not be aimed at perpetuating U.S. status, power, and
obligations, though it should be conservative in "using" U.S.
prestige, morale, and influence.
9. It should not have been foreclosed or embarrassed by prior
commitments of the U.S.
10. It should be responsive to national interests, sentiments, and doc-
trines, and should be negotiable.
11. It should be thoroughly planned so as to be able to become an
object of "sudden diplomacy."
12. It should be presented as a political ("above the melee" of nor-
mal diplomatic in-fighting and posturing).
13. It should improve current international standards, but should
not require thoroughgoing reform.
14. It should be potentially permanent (not necessarily a transitional
arrangement) and yet flexible enough to constitute a hedge
against events and opportunities in both negotiation and opera-
tion.
15. While not designed as a transitional arrangement, it should al-
low for major or basic developments and changes.
The most telling objection to this list may be not that it is idio-
syncratic but that it is too stringent and therefore impractical. Perhaps
no policy can meet all of these criteria satisfactorily, but I believe it
important to go as far as one can toward meeting them; and the policy
I am about to propose attempts to do so. And even if these criteria are
idiosyncratic or impractical, the list is intended to be rounded, non-
partisan, provocative (though not unnecessarily so) and of help to skep-
tics as well as to believers.
One Basic Proposal
Can nuclear weapons be made so limited in their usefulness that, by
and large, they will have relatively little effect on the conduct of inter-
national affairs, even in relatively intense crises; moreover can this be
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done in a manner that improves U.S. security and the international
order? An affirmative answer to this question would be a good begin-
ning to meeting the suggested criteria for an anti-nuclear policy. The
issue, therefore, is not simply whether nuclear weapons will spread, or
increase in number. Rather we should be more concerned with the
actual and perceived potential usefulness of these weapons, the prestige
attached to their possession, their attributes of legitimacy, danger or
terror, the felt necessity of various nations in the world to acquire them,
and the special role they play in various national policies and postures
in normal and crisis situations.
As a first approach imagine a world system in which each nation
agrees and expects that nuclear weapons cannot be used legitimately
except, possibly, for strict and proportionate retaliation. Each nuclear
nation would have adopted a no-first-use policy and a credible policy
of responding in commensurate kind and degree if nuclear weapons
were used against it. Non-nuclear nations could have made arrange-
ments to have such proportionate retaliation carried out by others. If
these expectations seemed reliable and credible, nations could not
credibly threaten to use nuclear weapons.
An objective, which could either supplement and complement such
a system or be independent of it, would be to restrict legitimate posses-
sion (or further acquisition) of nuclear weapons to international orga-
nizations-nuclear defense alliances in Western Europe, East Europe,
Asia, Latin America, North America, the North Atlantic, or even supra-
regional nuclear defense organizations.
A third objective might be to establish nuclear-free zones, particu-
larly in those areas of the world which do not currently seem likely to
be the scene of direct nuclear confrontations, e.g., Latin America, Af-
rica, the Middle East, parts of Asia, possibly the rim of Europe outside
the Western European Union.
All of these objectives are combined in the following long-term "anti-
nuclear" policy:
1. A return to the law of (nuclear) lex talionis, which would be
defined not only by the rule of at least an eye for an eye but also
(at least between equals) by the further rule of at most an eye for
an eye; or, to put it in current jargon, no escalation including
no-first-use.9
[9.] As discussed in the forthcoming Hudson Institute report, supra note 1, one might
modify this rule to distinguish between interior escalation (first use of nuclear weapons
on one's own sovereign territory) which does not justify any nuclear reprisal, and exterior
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2. A European nuclear retaliatory force whose sole purpose is to
enforce the lex talionis in Europe. This might take the form of a
European Strategic Defense Community based upon Western
European Union, or it might take some other form. It might not
be a Community, or it might be a Community which did not
include the United Kingdom, or France, or West Germany.
3. An Asian Nuclear Defense Organization which would enforce the
lex talionis in Asia. Probably this could not or should not take
the form of an independent Strategic Defense Community, at least
initially. Whatever form it did take, the nuclear defense organi-
zation might initially be based upon the United States, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, and per-
haps Great Britain. It could also exclude some of these states, at
least initially, and it would probably be-to some great degree
-under the effective and perhaps legal control of the United
States or perhaps Japan, India and/or Australia.
4. Nuclear-free zones in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, the
Middle East, and elsewhere, developed (with modification) from
current proposals.
5. A more or less explicit (and perhaps interim) United States (and
Soviet Union?) "talionic" guarantee to various non-nuclear areas,
which could vary for different areas, and which could be estab-
lished in terms of likely, minimum, or maximum responses to
nuclear provocations as appropriate to each area. The nature of
the guarantee might explicitly include provision for change over
time.
6. For the denuclearized zones, a long-term program might simul-
taneously be developed for a non-aligned multilateral nuclear de-
fense organization to play the same role for denuclearized zones
as the European and Asian nuclear forces play for their own areas,
thus possibly eventually replacing United States (and Soviet
Union?) talionic guarantees.
7. Finally, a universal agency could be developed to replace, sup-
plement, complement or absorb the various regional and national
forces.
escalation (first use of nuclear weapons on an opponent's territory) which does justify
reprisal against the homeland. While there are grave objections to trying to make interior
escalation legitimate (it would make possession of nuclear weapons more useful and
therefore more attractive) it may be necessary to accept some such compromise to satisfy
some European opinion.
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These arrangements probably seem Utopian. But if completely suc-
cessful, they would limit nuclear weapons to the U.S., the Soviet Union,
one international European organization, one international Asian or-
ganization, Ghina, and possibly certain other international organiza-
tions. The credibility of the talionic response to a nuclear provocation
-and therefore the deterrence of provocation-should be high. Not
only should nuclear intimidation be difficult but with time even the
mere thought of it might be eliminated from crises as well as day-to-day
international relations. Yet, if deterrence failed and weapons were used,
the result would not inevitably be Armageddon but (assuming expecta-
tions are fulfilled) whatever destruction was entailed in the tit-for-tat
response. Then conceivably, there would be a return to some previous
or ad hoc status quo. The system could conceivably withstand several
failures of deterrence and many other intense crises. Except for partici-
pation in the Asian nuclear force, this system would immediately reduce
U.S. obligations; eventually it would reduce them very sharply. While
the United States would be relegated to a status of first among equals,
in the long run this would probably be beneficial.
The lex talionis principle amounts to a return to the nineteenth-
century law of reprisal or the practice of primitive communities-par-
ticularly ones in which there are no reliable means for maintaining
order. By itself, it is therefore not an obviously Utopian notion. It
would also seem to provide a clear improvement over a situation in
which "spasm" or other all-out war occurs after the nuclear threshold
has been crossed. Its damage-limiting potentialities might be exceed-
ingly valuable, especially if alternative means to limit damage prove to
be unavailable or unreliable.
In such a tit-for-tat situation (as in most current peace-keeping situa-
tions), one does not usually ask who is right. The objective is to bring
the violence to a conclusion-"to stop the fighting as soon as possible"
---and to create precedents that prevent recurrence. It should be
obvious that it would be very difficult to bring violence between equals
to a conclusion as long as there is clearly an open-ended account in
which one side has done much more damage than the other. Therefore
there almost has to be some sort of "equitable," proportionate retalia-
tion before peace can be restored. This is of course exactly the technique
adopted by primitive tribes and for much the same reason-they wish
to restrain violence, but they have no police and judicial system with
which to do it. Of course, tit-for-tat occasionally results in long-con-
tinued blood feuds-in other words, it may generate further violence.
But more often than not it brings equilibrium. It is only because, as a
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system, it is more likely to support and restore peace than not that it
has been so popular in primitive communities. It may still be far
better in supplementing the usual system than anything else that is
actually available to the international system today.
In this regard it is worth noting that most intelligent laymen in the
U.S. now readily understand such points as the following: 10 (1) if a small
number of nuclear weapons are exploded in a country like the U.S.,
the President is more likely to ask questions than to press every button;
(2) after his questions are answered and he understands the situation,
he is still unlikely to lose all control of himself and launch a suicidal
"spasm" response; rather he is likely to ask what is in the national
interest of the United States, even if-and perhaps especially because-
the situation is agonizing and emotion-filled; (3) the national interest
may require a deliberate, measured, controlled and selective response;
(4) such a response could occur as a tit-for-tat or other reciprocal re-
taliation; (5) as a result, millions of people could be killed and yet
the war could come to a close with most of the weapons on every side
remaining unfired.
Many analysts see the relatively rigid tit-for-tat procedure as a retro-
gression from modem strategic thinking; it seems to buck the current
trend of emphasizing complete flexibility, control, ad hoc calculation
and a certain amount of deliberate uncertainty about the response. My
proposal does tend toward fixed response, indeed making it almost
deterministic, but in a fashion which is quite different from the old
massive retaliation doctrine. Rather than prescribing a simple spasm
response I am arguing for a response which is never larger than the
situation requires.
Thus, surprisingly enough, lex talionis arrangements would be
basically consistent with current U.S. policy and with emerging political-
strategic doctrine. They would extend, make explicit, and seek to
institutionalize more generally the profound disposition toward pro-
portionate response now widely held among American officials. Fur-
thermore, this disposition, which certainly exists in other countries
as well, is quite likely to affect the contingency policy of other nuclear
powers, whether they realize it ahead of time or not. In other words,
these proposals are not "Utopian" in the sense of being based on a
[10.] See KAHN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 185-86 & n. It is interesting to note that much
current fiction as well as scholarly analysis has used proportionate response as being tie
only plausible response in situations in which the only other apparent alternatives are
holocaust or an effectively passive acceptance of an extreme provocation.
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far-fetched principle; their Utopian character, if any, lies in requiring
an unlikely degree of success in institutionalizing already well-known,
sound, and comparatively desirable principles.
Of course, nuclear powers-particularly small ones--argue that a
total spasm response is all that they can afford, and any capability for
responding in corresponding degree and kind would dangerously de-
crease the value of their nuclear arsenal as a deterrent. Yet eventually
they will almost surely have to propose plans for the contingency in
which deterrence fails. Under their present "spasm" doctrine, they are
now faced with the unacceptable choice between surrender and night-
marish calamity. Certainly at the "moment of truth" even small nuclear
powers are likely to search desperately for alternatives to surrender or
holocaust-and they might feel they need advance contingency plans
and even declaratory policies that reflect the realistic situation, in order
to limit the maximum damage that might occur and to enhance the
credibility of their deterrent.
None of the above is certain, of course. But once concrete situations
are envisaged, and sequences of events and calculation are spelled out,
it is far from probable that a spasm response to nuclear attack will
seem preferable. Rather what has now become layman's common sense
might suggest basic principles and dearly reasonable assumptions on
which to base long-range policy. The nuclear control arrangements
envisaged do not presuppose that all nuclear powers will necessarily
act calculatingly, and in a measured and controlled manner. But de-
liberate, measured and controlled behavior can be made more certain
by cultivating the disposition to act that way on a world-wide scale
(rather than only in the U.S.) and by institutionalizing the principles
that seem to be implied in that disposition.
Any proposal that tries to do this will, of course, have to meet many
particular objections and difficulties. The forthcoming Hudson Insti-
tute report l considers many of these objections or difficulties. Let us
consider here only some of the more salient ones.
Some Basic Assumptions and Concepts
There are certain objections which could reasonably be made on the
level of principle, or basic assumption, before going into any discus-
sion of detailed feasibility. For example, the idea of "an eye for an eye"
might be manifestly unjust when it actually means "a city for a city,"
[11.] See note 1 supra.
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and when the city attacked in retaliation is inhabited by persons with
no special responsibility for the initial nuclear attack. Serious ethical
and political questions are raised, which depend in part upon empirical,
analytical and technical considerations, such as what response is pro-
portionate or whether a talionic doctrine would be more unjust or un-
stable than alternative doctrines. The injustice and other defects of
inflexible tit-for-tat must be compared with the possible infeasibility,
risk, or even immorality of counterforce, massive city attacks, and
other more or less flexible, ambiguous, or unpredictable doctrines as
well as the possible consequences of not retaliating at all or not retaliat-
ing in a manner that deters further attack. None of these questions can
be answered simply or dogmatically. In any case some allowance might
be made for responsible authorities to avoid at least the most rigid kind
of "city-for-city" retaliation.
The proposed European nuclear retaliatory force would differ in
important ways from the multilateral force that was proposed by the
U.S. and from the British proposal for an Atlantic nuclear force. I
envisage a truly independent nuclear deterrent for Europe, which,
while possessing a credible tit-for-tat response, would not permit any
member-nation to launch a spasm retaliatory response. A European
nuclear defense organization designed in this way would probably
represent an increase, rather than a decrease, in the kinds of inde-
pendence that European nations most desire. Moreover, distinguishing
between talionic and escalatory responses lets us solve the problems of
the "trigger" (who can launch nuclear weapons) and the safety catch
(who can forbid launching). One over-simplified but illustrative
possibility would be for everyone to have his finger on the trigger for
talionic responses and his finger on the safety-catch for escalation re-
sponses, i.e., any nation could authorize a proper tit-for-tat retaliation or
forbid excessive escalation. More complex and practical arrangements
are discussed in the forthcoming report.
One assumption underlying this proposal is that Western Europe is
a "pluralistic security community"-that within the Western European
subsystem war is almost literally "unthinkable" and the threat of
physical coercion plays almost no role in relations among the nations
within the community (though other kinds of threats are occasionally
made). Thus no provisions are necessary for the protection of Western
European nations from each other (though, in fact, the force could
be adapted to such a purpose, if necessary; but this is not envisioned
as an important purpose of the force). It is also assumed that Western
Europe needs independent power mainly because it does not want to
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continue to be a protectorate of the United States, and not because it
seeks to advance any aggressive designs against Communist or other
nations.
The Asian countries do not constitute a pluralistic security commu-
nity and, at least without the United States, there is not the same pri-
marily bipolar (though also polycentric) international alignment as
exists between Western and Eastern (including Soviet) Europe. There-
fore an Asian nuclear defense organization would have to be different,
perhaps more tentative and flexible, and probably with greater U.S.
involvement. There might be a special role for Japan and India. Japan
in particular seems likely to develop into the dominant non-Communist
power in Asia (and it may become more powerful than China).
As time passes, an Asian force would have to develop according to
the special requirements of the Asian area. It might ultimately become
a true collective security force whose purpose would be to furnish
security against aggression by its own members as well as by other
nations. It is premature to try to specify details, though it may be noted
that in contrast to the European situation, the two major non-Com-
munist Asian nations, Japan and India, are not unlikely in the future
to desire to fulfill national nuclear aspirations within the framework of
a regional force, and this expectation is one of the bases (though not
an essential one) on which the proposal is built.
Finally, it should be pointed out that while the proposal may seem
to have many bizarre aspects, most of the bizarreness derives from
coping with an unprecedented situation in which there has not been
as much thought about long-range policies and prospects as there might
have been. Thus the discussion in this paper will have achieved one
important objective if it simply takes the edge off the bizarreness, i.e.,
if it makes it easier to discuss the problem and to weigh various
alternative policies on their merits, rather than on relatively thought-
less (though often deeply held) emotional reactions.
There is, of course, some reason for a quick emotional rejection of
such proposals, since to consider them could create problems. Thus
they could arouse ambitions for the acquisition of nuclear weapons in
nations which are currently more or less satisfied with the status quo
(in particular it may increase West German and Japanese nuclear
ambitions). These proposals, if accepted, would bring many nations
closer to nuclear weapons than they are today. Even the possibility that
they may be realized in some form or other can create problems. For
example, the so-called "MLF clause" (i.e., the U.S. insistence that any
anti-proliferation treaty allow for the creation of a multi-national force
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which absorbs one of the current nuclear forces) seems to be a major
block in the negotiation of the current non-proliferation treaty. The
possibility of an Asian nuclear force might create similar or greater
difficulties. (But the analogy is not completely relevant. The major
objection to the MLF clause comes from the Soviet Union, which is
clearly worried about West Germany. Furthermore, West Germany's
nuclear ambitions, if any, do not have the approval or support of any of
its allies on the Continent. In this respect Japan seems to be in a much
different position both vis4-vis the Soviet Union and its own allies.)
Several important issues remain to be considered. For example,
what would happen if the various multilateral or other nuclear forces
were dissolved? Or if a nuclear organization allowed too much
authority to decision makers who might feel substantially more inde-
pendent of the "political authorities" than would representatives of a
nation-state? There are also many possible Soviet reactions to the pro-
posals, and I have not considered any of the pressures or problems
that they might create if the proposal were seriously advanced. And
nations in non-nuclear regions might object to their status once they see
the real possibility of regional (or even national) deterrents working.
Eventually they in turn may wish to have a regional deterrent of their
own, or they might seek security in some other international organiza-
tion. The creation of a European Strategic Defense Community would
probably increase pressures toward such a solution. And, as already
mentioned, my proposal might increase desire for national acquisition
of nuclear status in Italy and West Germany. All of the above points
and objections must be conceded, and others as well. Nevertheless it
seems clear that there is insufficient thought in the government and in
scholarly communities about the possibilities or implications of:
1. The use of lex talionis as a guiding principle.
2. The distinction between interior and exterior escalation or
between talionic responses and escalation. (Neither of these dis-
tinctions seems to have been considered in relation to the MLF,
yet they might make all the difference as to its role and to the
"trigger" and "safety-catch" problems.)
3. The need for modifying U.S. guarantees if (or as) the Soviet
Union acquires a reliable and large second-strike capability.
4. Coming to grips with a situation of increasing multipolarity in
which the United States and the Soviet Union will not dominate
international relations anywhere near as much as they still do,
and in which guarantees which have any hint of "protectorate"
about them will be less acceptable.
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5. The need to divorce current nuclear arrangements from the
political legacy of World War II. The victors must recognize
that they cannot keep the nuclear club an exclusive victor's club.
6. The possibility of various ad hoc regional or other special insti-
tutions and practices that lie between the usual meliorative and
comprehensive proposals, particularly suggestions that may ex-
ploit or deal with the concepts suggested above.
7. The fifteen general criteria for a long-range anti-nuclear policy,
listed above.
